A jury found that CenturyLink willfully broke the Fair Credit Reporting Act and awarded a class of 56,075 people $140,187,500. The Ninth Circuit took back every dollar. It never decided whether CenturyLink broke the law.
That’s the part that should bother you. The jury sat through four days of evidence and found for Lydia Bultemeyer and the class: $500 apiece in statutory damages, $2,000 apiece in punitive damages. On September 22, 2026, the appeals court wiped it out. Bultemeyer v. CenturyLink, Inc., No. 24-6413 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 2026) (per curiam). Did CenturyLink break the law? The court said it didn’t need to answer that:
We need not resolve this dispute here because CenturyLink is protected by the safe harbor recognized in Safeco.
Translation: maybe the company did it and maybe it didn’t, but its lawyers could have read the statute the company’s way, so it walks. That’s the FCRA’s willfulness rule working exactly the way it was built.
What did CenturyLink do at step four?
The facts come straight from the opinion. CenturyLink sold internet service through a five-step online checkout. Pick a plan. Customize it. Look over your cart. Then, at step four, type in your name, birth date, and billing address, pick an installation date, and check a box accepting terms that said a “credit check is required to complete all online orders.” Step five showed you the estimated price, took your card, and gave you a button: “Submit Order”.
Bultemeyer made it through step four and bailed at step five. Later a credit-monitoring service told her somebody had run a hard pull on her. The name on the inquiry was “Qwest Land-Line,” which turned out to be a CenturyLink affiliate.
It wasn’t just her. CenturyLink ran an automated pull on everybody who clicked “next” at step four. About half the time it went to outside sources for the data, and the answer came back in seconds. Why bother? It ran an identity-fraud screen that scored every shopper from R1 to R9. And it used the credit data to decide whether to tack on a deposit, which would show up in the price at step five. The court put it this way: “the price CenturyLink quotes to some customers at step five depends on the results of the credit check pulled after step four.”
Bultemeyer sued in November 2014. The case bounced up to the Ninth Circuit twice before anybody saw a jury: once after the district court tossed it for lack of standing (the Ninth Circuit reversed), once over class certification. The class got trimmed along the way, partly because people who went on to become customers had signed arbitration clauses or class waivers. Ever wonder what that fine print is for? That’s what it does. Then trial, verdict, appeal.
When have you “initiated” anything online?
A business can’t pull your report just because it’d like to see it. It needs a reason off the statute’s list. CenturyLink’s reason sits in 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(3)(F). A credit bureau can furnish a report to someone who:
otherwise has a legitimate business need for the information— (i) in connection with a business transaction that is initiated by the consumer
The whole case hangs on that one word. Bultemeyer said she hadn’t initiated anything until she clicked Submit, and before that “any business transaction is merely hypothetical.” CenturyLink said she’d started the deal by step four. She’d picked her services, looked over a cart, handed over her information, chosen an install date, and agreed to the terms. All that was left was a card number and a click.
The panel grabbed two dictionaries, found “initiate” defined as “commence; start; originate” and “begin, introduce, set going, originate”, and decided CenturyLink’s reading was fair game:
Because the term “initiated” lacks definition in the statute and bears a range of possible reasonable meanings, we conclude that CenturyLink’s reading has foundation in the statute.
That’s box one on the Safeco checklist. Box two was a gimme. Bultemeyer pointed to circuit cases on what counts as a “business transaction”, and the panel said she was answering the wrong question: “Bultemeyer has not directed us to, and we have not found, any appellate decision that has addressed the question of when a business transaction has been initiated.”
Box three was the real fight. In 1998, Federal Trade Commission staff wrote a letter about car dealers pulling credit on people who wander onto the showroom floor. It said “a request for general information about products and prices offered does not involve a business transaction initiated by the consumer.” The FTC later rolled that letter into a 2011 staff report, 40 Years of Experience with the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Bultemeyer said that was all the warning CenturyLink needed.
The panel skipped whether the report even counts as “authoritative guidance” in the first place. Even if it does, the court said, it was talking about car lots:
This cannot put CenturyLink, a telecommunications company soliciting online customers, on notice that its practices are contrary to agency guidance.
Courts don’t agree on that, and one of the cases the panel cited came out of Minnesota. In Beseke v. Equifax Information Services LLC, No. 17-4971 (DWF/KMM) (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 2019), the federal court here leaned on the same FTC report, plus a Seventh Circuit decision and FTC staff letters, and found Equifax “had the benefit of guidance that might have warned it away from the view it took.” Then it let a jury decide whether that guidance made Equifax’s reading objectively unreasonable. Same report. Different courtroom. Different weight.
Three boxes, three checks. “We do not overturn a jury verdict lightly”, the panel wrote. Then it overturned one.
Same panel, same vote, opposite answers
The opinion was per curiam, from Judges Clifton, Bybee, and Miller. Two of them wrote separately anyway, and they answered the statutory question in opposite directions.
Judge Clifton would have called CenturyLink right. If a shopper comes to the site on her own and gets through everything but the last step, he says, she’s initiated the deal. “She went well beyond window shopping.” His bigger worry is deposits. Make a company quote a “final” price before it can check credit, let the check add a deposit, and the customer gets ambushed at the register. He compared it to hotel “destination fees” and wrote: “Looked like ‘bait and switch’ to me.” Bottom line: “If required to answer the question, I would hold that CenturyLink’s interpretation was not only reasonable but also correct under the FCRA.”
Judge Bybee says CenturyLink was wrong and the court ducked. He borrows from contract law. You haven’t initiated a transaction “until the consumer knows the material terms for the purchase”, and CenturyLink’s shoppers didn’t know the full price, deposit and all, until step five. Until Bultemeyer knew the full cost and hit Submit, he’d hold, she hadn’t initiated anything. He also gets the best line in the opinion, and it’s about Walmart: “Yet we would be dismayed if Walmart pulled our credit once we picked up a cart and passed the greeters just because Walmart thought that we were commencing a business transaction and it needed our credit information.” His fix for CenturyLink is short: “Ask for consent before pulling the report.”
What really gets under his skin is what the court’s silence does. The panel assumed a violation, excused it, and left CenturyLink free to keep right on doing it:
For CenturyLink, nothing has changed except that its Safeco defense has now become a Safeco license to continue presumptively to violate FCRA.
He called the pull policy “a feature, not a bug”, and added: “Fifty-six years later, we still don’t know when a business transaction has been ‘initiated by the consumer.’”
He’s right about that last part. The next company that pulls credit at step four of an online checkout gets the same three boxes checked, because no appellate court has answered the question. Bybee said the decision “virtually guarantees that there will be further litigation.” I’d bet on it.
How a jury’s finding stops mattering
Safeco Insurance Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47 (2007), held that “willfully” in § 1681n reaches reckless violations, not just knowing ones. Then it built the escape hatch. If a company’s reading of the statute, “albeit erroneous, was not objectively unreasonable”, the company isn’t reckless. 551 U.S. at 69. I’ve walked through that standard before, so I’ll skip the rerun.
Bultemeyer shows how little the facts matter once the reading passes. The Eighth Circuit, which covers Minnesota, said as much in Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., 754 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 2014). That was a receipt case under the same willfulness provision. The court took it as given, for the appeal, that Sam’s Club broke the statute by printing too many card digits, and affirmed dismissal anyway, because the store’s reading was objectively reasonable. Then it shut the door on evidence of motive:
When a party has read the statute in an objectively reasonable manner, we need not consider facts relating to the party’s subjective intent in assessing willfulness.
754 F.3d at 502. Put Hammer and Bultemeyer side by side and it’s blunt. A jury can find the company did it. The plaintiff can bring evidence of bad faith. None of it gets weighed if a court decides the company’s lawyers had a plausible reading and no appellate court or agency had told them otherwise.
So sue for negligence instead? Don’t count on it.
The usual fallback is 15 U.S.C. § 1681o. It covers negligent violations and pays “any actual damages sustained by the consumer as a result of the failure”, plus fees. No willfulness, so no Safeco. Right?
Not so fast in the Ninth Circuit. In Marino v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, No. 19-15530 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020), the plaintiffs asked only for statutory and punitive damages, and the court said this anyway:
To prove a negligent violation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant acted pursuant to an objectively unreasonable interpretation of the statute.
Slip op. at 8. Under either standard, the court said, when the statute’s language is unclear, a defendant “will nearly always avoid liability so long as an appellate court has not already interpreted that language.” Slip op. at 9. Marino didn’t have a negligence claim in front of it, so that line is the Ninth Circuit thinking out loud. If it sticks, a negligence claim in a pure what-does-this-word-mean fight like Bultemeyer goes down with the willfulness claim.
And here? I couldn’t find an Eighth Circuit or District of Minnesota decision that adopts Marino’s negligence rule or rejects it. I searched CourtListener’s opinion collection several different ways. Nothing. Don’t read the silence as a green light.
Negligence still earns its keep in the case that isn’t about reading the statute. A pull with no arguable purpose at all. The wrong person’s file. A procedure the company had on paper and didn’t follow. Nobody’s parsing a fuzzy word there. Somebody screwed up, and § 1681o is built for that.
But § 1681o pays only actual damages, and the Eighth Circuit means it. In Taylor v. Tenant Tracker, Inc., 710 F.3d 824 (8th Cir. 2013), the court held “a consumer must present competent evidence of actual injury to state a claim under the FCRA.” Id. at 828. Taylor testified she was “extremely upset and embarrassed”, and a witness saw her crying. Didn’t cut it. “Taylor offered no reasonable detail about the nature and extent of her alleged emotional distress”, and “corroboration of a brief episode of frustration and unhappiness does not establish the sort of concrete emotional distress that is required to constitute a genuine injury and actual damages.” Id. at 829.
A hard inquiry you never authorized is a real problem. Putting a dollar figure on it is a whole other job.
Somebody pulled your report without asking. Here’s what I’d do.
Find out who did it. Under 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(a)(3)(A)(ii), a credit bureau’s file disclosure has to identify each person that procured your report for a non-employment purpose in the prior year. Under § 1681g(a)(3)(B), that means the name or full trade name, and if you ask, an address and phone number. Ask. Bultemeyer saw “Qwest Land-Line” and had to play detective.
Save the inquiry record. Download or print the disclosure that shows the pull and its date, and hang on to it. Don’t count on a bureau dispute fixing this. The inquiry’s accurate. Somebody really did pull your report, and the question is whether they had the right. Disputes are for information that’s wrong, and that’s a different fight.
Know who the claim is against. It’s whoever pulled the report. Section 1681b(f) says “A person shall not use or obtain a consumer report for any purpose unless” the purpose is one the statute allows and the user certified it under § 1681e. Nothing in that subsection makes a dispute a condition of the claim. The bureau has its own, separate duty under § 1681e(a): its procedures must require users to “identify themselves, certify the purposes for which the information is sought, and certify that the information will be used for no other purpose.” Bultemeyer sued the company that pulled. The caption reads Bultemeyer v. CenturyLink. No bureau in sight.
Write the harm down while it’s happening. Denied applications, higher rates, deposits, time off work, a doctor’s note if it got that far. Taylor is your yardstick. I’ve laid out how that proof gets built, and it gets built early or not at all.
Know which claim you’ve got. § 1681n pays statutory damages “of not less than $100 and not more than $1,000” plus punitive damages, but only for willful violations, and Safeco is standing at that door. § 1681o pays what you can prove you lost. A pull that rests on an arguable reading of the statute is a § 1681n case with a Safeco defense waiting for it. A pull that rests on nothing is a different animal. Standing is its own hurdle; here’s what TransUnion did to it.
Watch the clock. § 1681p gives you two years from discovery or five from the violation, whichever comes first.
And if you run a business that takes orders online, Judge Bybee already did your homework. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2) lets a bureau furnish a report “In accordance with the written instructions of the consumer to whom it relates.” Get the consent. It costs you a checkbox.
CenturyLink spent twelve years in court and, as of the Ninth Circuit’s ruling, owes nothing. Until some court says when an online shopper has “initiated” anything, every company with a checkout page gets the benefit of the doubt. Twelve years. $140,187,500. And we still don’t know what one word means.
Madgett Law, LLC represents Minnesota consumers in Fair Credit Reporting Act cases, including impermissible-pull claims, inaccurate reporting, and disputes the bureaus won’t fix, through our Credit File Corrections practice. If someone pulled your credit without a reason, send us a message.
Sources: Bultemeyer v. CenturyLink, Inc., No. 24-6413 (9th Cir. Sept. 22, 2026) (per curiam), slip op. at 5 ($28 million statutory and $112 million punitive; “We hold that CenturyLink was entitled to a Safeco defense”), 8–9 (five-step process; “credit check is required to complete all online orders”; “Qwest Land-Line”; automated pulls after step four; outside sources roughly half the time, within seconds; R1–R9 identity score), 10 (“the price CenturyLink quotes to some customers at step five depends on the results of the credit check pulled after step four”; complaint filed November 2014; 2017 standing dismissal reversed in 2019; class-certification history and arbitration/class-waiver exclusion), 11 (class of 56,075; four-day trial; $500 statutory and $2,000 punitive per member; “more than $140 million”), 12 (“We need not resolve this dispute here”), 13–14 (dictionary definitions; Bultemeyer’s “merely hypothetical” reading; “bears a range of possible reasonable meanings”), 15 (no appellate decision on when a transaction is initiated), 17–21 (1998 FTC staff letter; 40 Years Report; Beseke; “This cannot put CenturyLink . . . on notice”; “We do not overturn a jury verdict lightly”); id. at 22–28 (Clifton, J., concurring) (“She went well beyond window shopping”, at 23; “bait and switch”, at 26; “not only reasonable but also correct”, at 28); id. at 28–41 (Bybee, J., concurring) (“Safeco license”, at 29; “a feature, not a bug” and “Fifty-six years later,” at 37; “virtually guarantees that there will be further litigation”, at 38; Walmart, at 39; “until the consumer knows the material terms for the purchase” and “Ask for consent before pulling the report”, at 40), Ninth Circuit opinion PDF. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 57, 69 (2007) (willfulness reaches reckless violations; “albeit erroneous, was not objectively unreasonable”), Caselaw Access Project. Hammer v. Sam’s East, Inc., 754 F.3d 492, 501–02 (8th Cir. 2014) (accepting the violation, affirming on Safeco; subjective intent not considered where the reading is objectively reasonable), Caselaw Access Project. Marino v. Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, No. 19-15530 (9th Cir. Oct. 20, 2020), slip op. at 8–9 (negligence requires an objectively unreasonable interpretation; “will nearly always avoid liability”), Ninth Circuit opinion PDF. Taylor v. Tenant Tracker, Inc., 710 F.3d 824, 828–29 (8th Cir. 2013) (competent evidence of actual injury; emotional-distress proof), Caselaw Access Project. Beseke v. Equifax Info. Servs. LLC, No. 17-4971 (DWF/KMM) (D. Minn. Nov. 22, 2019), Mem. Op. & Order at 22–23 (FTC guidance “might have warned it away”; willfulness left for the jury), govinfo. 15 U.S.C. § 1681b(a)(2), (a)(3)(F)(i), (f); § 1681e(a); § 1681g(a)(3)(A)(ii), (a)(3)(B); § 1681n(a)(1)(A); § 1681o(a)(1); § 1681p, Cornell Legal Information Institute.
This article is general legal information about federal law and Minnesota practice, not legal advice, and reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship. It describes decisions in cases involving other parties; nothing here predicts how any court would rule on your facts, and no outcome is promised or implied.