Stop paying a credit card in Houston and the bank has four years to sue you. Stop paying it in Minneapolis and it has six.
On the length of the clock, Texas wins, and by two full years. But the clock isn’t the whole fight. The real question on an old card is what can restart it, and who’s allowed to try. That’s where Minnesota pulls ahead, and where Texas pulls one trick Minnesota never thought of.
This is part of the series on whether Minnesota or Texas actually protects the person who owes. It starts with wages at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-wage-garnishment-571-922/. Most recently I compared homestead exemptions at /news/minnesota-vs-texas-homestead-exemption-cap-510-02/. This round is about time.
Every box Texas has for a card debt holds four years
Texas lists its four-year claims in one section, and “debt” is on the list. “A person must bring suit on the following actions not later than four years after the day the cause of action accrues”, including “(3) debt”. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004(a)(3). The Supreme Court of Texas, in a 2008 card case, called that “the four-year statute of limitations on debt collection actions.” Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 797 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam).
A card company can also plead its case as an open account, and Texas courts let it. “An action to collect a credit card debt may be brought as an action on an ‘open account.’” Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. Conti, 345 S.W.3d 490, 491 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). That gets the creditor a different statute, § 16.004(c), with the same number: four years. And even a claim that fit no box at all would hit the residual rule, which is also four years. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.051.
The open-account label matters for one reason: when the clock starts. Under subsection (c), “the cause of action accrues on the day that the dealings in which the parties were interested together cease.” § 16.004(c). In Conti, the cardholder proved his last payment was in June 2005 and the bank sued in August 2009, more than four years later. He won summary judgment and then lost it on appeal, because “proof of the date of last payment is not conclusive evidence of the date upon which the parties’ dealings ceased.” 345 S.W.3d at 491–92. Four years from when is a fight of its own.
Weaver carries the other lesson, and it’s the one I’d tattoo on every collection defendant’s forearm if I could. The cardholder there answered the requests for admission by citing § 16.004 over and over. The court held that wasn’t enough. “A limitations defense is an affirmative defense, which is in the nature of a confession and avoidance”, and “it must be asserted in a pleading.” 262 S.W.3d at 798. Judgment for Unifund. Minnesota is the same: “statute of limitations” is on the list of defenses a party “shall set forth affirmatively”. Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03. In neither state does the clock enforce itself.
Minnesota gives six, and has since 2013
Minnesota’s consumer-debt statute is one paragraph:
Notwithstanding section 541.31, subdivision 1, actions upon an obligation arising out of a consumer debt primarily for personal, family, or household purposes shall be commenced within six years. After its expiration, the statute of limitations is not revived by the collection of a payment on an account, a discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding, or an oral or written reaffirmation of the debt.
— Minn. Stat. § 541.053
It isn’t new. The Legislature enacted it effective August 1, 2013. 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 104, § 2. The same act created Minnesota’s debt-buyer default-judgment rules, which took effect a month later, on September 1, 2013. Id. § 3. Section 541.053’s history line shows no amendment since.
Notice that the six years didn’t change anything by themselves. Minnesota already gave six years to an action “upon a contract or other obligation, express or implied, as to which no other limitation is expressly prescribed”. Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1). I covered that general rule and its traps at /news/minnesota-statutes-of-limitations-civil-claims/. The 2013 statute’s work is in its two other clauses: the one that starts it and the one that ends it.
Both states used to let one signed letter bring an old debt back
This one surprised me. On the old rule, Minnesota and Texas are close to twins.
Minnesota: “No acknowledgment or promise shall be evidence of a new or continuing contract sufficient to take the case out of the operation of this chapter unless the same is contained in some writing signed by the party to be charged thereby; but this section shall not alter the effect of a payment of principal or interest.” Minn. Stat. § 541.17.
Texas: an acknowledgment of a claim that “appears to be barred by limitations” isn’t admissible to defeat limitations “unless the acknowledgment is in writing and is signed by the party to be charged.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.065.
Same idea, nearly the same words, and the same trap: sign the collector’s letter agreeing you owe it, and you may have handed a dead claim a new life. The one real difference is that tail on Minnesota’s version: the signed-writing rule leaves whatever a payment does to the clock exactly where it was. For consumer debt, § 541.053 now answers that question too, and the answer is that a payment won’t revive an expired period. Texas’s § 16.065 has no such clause. How that worked in Minnesota before 2013, and what’s left of it, is at /news/minnesota-time-barred-debt-acknowledgment/.
Then each state closed the door. They closed different doors.
Minnesota’s fix covers the bank. Texas’s covers the debt buyer.
Minnesota’s 2013 sentence says an expired period “is not revived by the collection of a payment on an account, a discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding, or an oral or written reaffirmation of the debt.” § 541.053. It doesn’t say who’s collecting. The bank that issued the card, the debt buyer that bought it, and the law firm suing for either one all get the same rule.
Texas waited until 2019, and wrote its fix for one kind of plaintiff:
(c) A debt buyer may not, directly or indirectly, commence an action against or initiate arbitration with a consumer to collect a consumer debt after the expiration of the applicable limitations period provided by Section 16.004, Civil Practice and Remedies Code, or Section 3.118, Business & Commerce Code.
(d) If an action to collect a consumer debt is barred under Subsection (c), the cause of action is not revived by a payment of the consumer debt, an oral or written reaffirmation of the consumer debt, or any other activity on the consumer debt.
— Tex. Fin. Code § 392.307(c)–(d)
The section was added by H.B. 996, effective September 1, 2019, and “[u]nless otherwise expressly provided,” it “prevails to the extent of any conflict” with other Texas law. Id. § 392.307(b).
Who’s a “debt buyer”? The section defines it for itself, not in the chapter’s general definitions: “a person who purchases or otherwise acquires a consumer debt from a creditor or other subsequent owner of the consumer debt,” whether it collects the debt itself, hires a collector, or hires a lawyer. Id. § 392.307(a)(2). Two carve-outs: a buyer who picks up defaulted debt “incidental to the purchase of a portfolio that predominantly consists of consumer debt that has not been charged off”, and a check-services company. Id. § 392.307(a)(2)(A)–(B).
Read that definition and ask whether the bank that issued your card fits it. It didn’t buy your debt from anybody. On the words, the bank that issued the card is outside § 392.307, and a Texas card issuer suing on its own account is back to the general rule in § 16.065, where a signed writing can still revive a barred claim.
So who reaches further? On who’s covered, Minnesota, plainly. On what’s covered, Texas has two edges. Its no-revival list ends with “any other activity on the consumer debt”, a catch-all Minnesota doesn’t have. And its bar names arbitration expressly. Minnesota’s covers a “discharge in a bankruptcy proceeding,” which Texas’s doesn’t mention.
Texas makes the debt buyer say it out loud
This is the trick Minnesota never thought of. A Texas debt buyer collecting on a debt it can no longer sue on has to tell you so, in the first letter. Id. § 392.307(e). The Legislature wrote the words, and they come in three versions depending on credit reporting:
- If the debt can still be reported and the buyer reports it: “THE LAW LIMITS HOW LONG YOU CAN BE SUED ON A DEBT. BECAUSE OF THE AGE OF YOUR DEBT, WE WILL NOT SUE YOU FOR IT. IF YOU DO NOT PAY THE DEBT, [INSERT NAME OF DEBT BUYER] MAY CONTINUE TO REPORT IT TO CREDIT REPORTING AGENCIES AS UNPAID FOR AS LONG AS THE LAW PERMITS THIS REPORTING. THIS NOTICE IS REQUIRED BY LAW.” Id. § 392.307(e)(1).
- If it can still be reported but the buyer doesn’t report it: “THE LAW LIMITS HOW LONG YOU CAN BE SUED ON A DEBT. BECAUSE OF THE AGE OF YOUR DEBT, WE WILL NOT SUE YOU FOR IT. THIS NOTICE IS REQUIRED BY LAW.” Id. § 392.307(e)(2).
- If the reporting period has run: “THE LAW LIMITS HOW LONG YOU CAN BE SUED ON A DEBT. BECAUSE OF THE AGE OF YOUR DEBT, WE WILL NOT SUE YOU FOR IT, AND WE WILL NOT REPORT IT TO ANY CREDIT REPORTING AGENCY. THIS NOTICE IS REQUIRED BY LAW.” Id. § 392.307(e)(3).
The notice has to be in at least 12-point type, “boldfaced, capitalized, or underlined or otherwise conspicuously set out from the surrounding written material.” Id. § 392.307(f). The capitals above are how the statute prints it.
Minnesota’s collection statute bars a collection agency, debt buyer, or collector from commencing “legal action to collect a debt outside the limitations period set forth in section 541.053.” Minn. Stat. § 332.37(a)(24). I didn’t find a Minnesota counterpart to the Texas notice anywhere in § 332.37’s list of prohibited practices. What chapter 332 does and doesn’t give you is at /news/minnesota-debt-collection-practices/.
The federal rule skips the bank
The federal floor is the same in both states. Regulation F says it flat: “A debt collector must not bring or threaten to bring a legal action against a consumer to collect a time-barred debt.” 12 C.F.R. § 1006.26(b). It doesn’t require a disclosure.
But it binds a “debt collector”, and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act defines that as a business whose principal purpose is collecting debts, or a person who regularly collects “debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). A bank collecting its own card balance under its own name is collecting a debt owed to itself.
Put the three rules together and the hole is the same one twice. The federal ban skips the issuing bank. Texas’s ban skips it too. Minnesota’s § 541.053 is the only one of the three that, on its words, reaches the bank that issued the card.
What if the card agreement picks another state’s law?
A card agreement may name another state’s law to govern it. Here the 2013 statute does something I didn’t see coming.
Minnesota has a borrowing statute, which the Minnesota Supreme Court described in exactly those words: “In 2004, the legislature enacted a new borrowing statute based on the Uniform Conflict of Laws-Limitations Act.” Fleeger v. Wyeth, 771 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Minn. 2009). It says that if a claim is “substantively based” on the law of one other state, “the limitation period of that state applies”. Minn. Stat. § 541.31, subd. 1(a)(1). The Eighth Circuit, applying Minnesota’s rules, put it bluntly: “Minnesota has, by statute, clearly demonstrated that it does not have a strong governmental interest in applying its own statutes of limitations.” Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1126 (8th Cir. 2012). In that case a Texas investor’s contract claims, brought in Minnesota and governed by Delaware law, were dismissed under Delaware’s three-year statute. Id. at 1122, 1130.
Delaware’s three years reach “no action based on a promise,” among others. Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106(a). So between 2004 and 2013, a Minnesota consumer sued on a card agreement governed by Delaware law had a real argument that the card company got three years, not six.
Then read the first five words of § 541.053 again: “Notwithstanding section 541.31, subdivision 1”. On consumer debt, the borrowing statute is switched off, and the period is six years. On its words, that cuts both ways. If the chosen state’s period is longer than six, Minnesota’s six still controls, which is the point the acknowledgment piece makes. If the chosen state’s period is shorter, Minnesota’s six controls too. A consumer statute meant to protect Minnesotans can hand a card company more time than the law it picked for itself. I couldn’t find a Minnesota appellate decision applying § 541.053’s opening clause; I searched CourtListener’s Minnesota state and federal opinions for the section number and for the borrowing statute by name.
Texas hard-wired its own number the same way. A debt buyer’s bar runs from “the applicable limitations period provided by Section 16.004”, Texas’s own four years. Tex. Fin. Code § 392.307(c).
The scorecard
Texas wins on length. Four years beats six, and every route Texas has for a card debt lands on four.
Minnesota wins on reach. Its no-revival rule covers the bank that issued the card, the debt buyer, and everyone in between, and it covers a bankruptcy discharge. Texas’s covers debt buyers only, and leaves the issuing bank with the old signed-writing rule.
Texas wins on candor. Its debt buyers have to tell you, in type that can’t be missed, that they won’t sue. Minnesota’s don’t.
Call it two rounds to one for Texas, with an asterisk Minnesota wrote itself: on a card agreement that picks a short-clock state, Minnesota’s own consumer statute may be the thing giving the card company its extra years.
Madgett Law, LLC
Madgett Law, LLC represents Minnesota consumers against debt collectors and debt buyers, including defending collection suits on stale accounts and litigating the § 541.053 limitations defense. We also help people look at settlement and negotiated alternatives before a judgment narrows the options (more on that on our bankruptcy avoidance page), and at what Minnesota’s exemptions already protect (distressed asset protection). If you’ve been sued on an old card, or a collector wants a payment or a signature on one, send us a message.
Sources: Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 16.004(a)(3) (four years on debt), (c) (open or stated account; accrual when dealings cease); § 16.051 (residual four-year period); § 16.065 (acknowledgment must be in writing and signed) (Texas Constitution and Statutes, Texas Legislative Council). Tex. Fin. Code § 392.307(a)(2) (debt buyer defined; exclusions), (b) (unless otherwise expressly provided, prevails over conflicting law), (c) (no action or arbitration after the § 16.004 period), (d) (no revival by payment, reaffirmation, or other activity), (e)(1)–(3) (required notices), (f) (type size and conspicuousness); Acts 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 1055 (H.B. 996), § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 2019 (Texas Constitution and Statutes, Texas Legislative Council). Unifund CCR Partners v. Weaver, 262 S.W.3d 796, 797–98 (Tex. 2008) (per curiam); Capital One Bank (USA), N.A. v. Conti, 345 S.W.3d 490, 491–92 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.). Minn. Stat. § 541.053 (six years on consumer debt notwithstanding § 541.31, subd. 1; no revival by payment, bankruptcy discharge, or reaffirmation); 2013 Minn. Laws ch. 104, § 2 (enacting § 541.053, effective August 1, 2013), § 3 (enacting § 548.101, effective September 1, 2013); Minn. Stat. § 541.05, subd. 1(1) (six years on contract); § 541.17 (acknowledgment or promise must be in a signed writing; effect of a payment of principal or interest not altered); § 541.31, subd. 1(a)(1) (limitation period of the state whose law is the substantive basis of the claim); § 332.37(a)(24) (no legal action outside the § 541.053 period). Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.03 (statute of limitations is an affirmative defense). Fleeger v. Wyeth, 771 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Minn. 2009); Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1122, 1126, 1130 (8th Cir. 2012). Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 8106(a) (three years on actions based on a promise) (Delaware Code Online). 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6) (debt collector defined) (United States Code, 2024 ed., govinfo); 12 C.F.R. § 1006.26(b) (no suit or threat of suit on time-barred debt) (eCFR). This article is general information about Minnesota law, not legal advice. Reading it does not create an attorney–client relationship, and no outcome is promised or implied.